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STANDING TO CHALLENGE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
DECISIONMAKING:
THE NEED FOR A BETTER RATIONALE
A taxpayer dissatisfied with tax treatment received from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has alternative avenues of recourse.
The taxpayer may either litigate a notice of deficiency' in the Tax
Court without remitting any or all of the assessed tax, 2 or pay the
tax and seek relief in a federal district court or the United States
Court of Claims. 3 A taxpayer dissatisfied with IRS decisionmaking
which does not directly affect his tax liability, but which causes him
injury, is faced with a plethora of hurdles to overcome if he is to
achieve any redress. 4 One such hurdle frequently encountered is
standing. 5 In 1970 in Association of Data Processing Services v.
Camp, 6 the United States Supreme Court set forth two tests to
determine whether a party has standing: the "injury in fact" test 7
and the "zone of interests" test.8 In recent years the Supreme
1.

I.R.C.

§

6212 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, upon finding a defi-

ciency as defined in I.R.C. § 6211, to send notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer.
2. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
3. I.R.C. § 7422. Although it might appear that the taxpayer receives a financial
advantage by litigating in the Tax Court without having to pay, interest is assessed at
a rate prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6621(b), on
any deficiency owed by the taxpayer, I.R.C. § 6601(a), or refund owed to the taxpayer, I.R.C. § 6611(a), making the result identical. If a taxpayer, however, at the
time of notice of deficiency, has little or no money available, the advantages of pursuing the Tax Court route are apparent.
4. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976),
where among the various defenses raised were the nonjusticiability of the subject
matter, the statutory bars of the Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1970), and the traditional defense of sovereign immunity. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1976).
5. For an analysis of the current law of standing, see Tushnet, The New Law of
Standing:A Pleafor Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977). See generally 3
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAV TREATISE § 22, at 208-94 (1958); id. at 702-87
(Supp. 1970); id. at 166-82 (Cum. Supp. 1977); K. DAVIS, ADMNISTRATIVE LAW
TEx-r 419-39 (3d ed. 1972); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An
Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again,
84 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1971); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645 (1973).
6. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
7. Id. at 152.
8. Id. at 153.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1041

Court has refined the injury in fact test to the extent that it is too
often applied to avoid confronting the underlying issues. 9
After briefly outlining the basic concepts of the law of standing, this note will address the manner in which each of the tests
announced in Data Processing has been applied by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in two recent decisions
denying the right of one party to challenge another party's tax
status.' 0 In American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal,"' the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), as representative of the private travel industry, sought to challenge the favorable tax treatment accorded competitors of its constituents. ASTA
alleged economic injury in the form of a competitive disadvantage.
The court of appeals held that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for
failure to meet the injury in fact test as most recently construed by
the Supreme Court in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization.'2 In Tax Advocates and Analysts v. Blumenthal,'3
decided three months prior to ASTA, the owner of an oil well operated in the United States brought suit to challenge a series of
Revenue Rulings 14 which extended application of section 901 of the
Internal Revenue Code (the Code) to include payments by United
States oil companies operating abroad in connection with oil extraction. Section 901 provides a federal income tax credit for taxes paid
to a foreign country, thus excluding domestic oil wells. The court
of appeals, applying the zone of interests test, denied standing.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STANDING DOCTRINE

The purpose of the law of standing is to screen out improper
plaintiffs.' 5 It is based on article III of the United States Constitu9. In this note, the underlying issue is the right of one party to challenge the
tax status of a third party via a lawsuit against the IRS. See Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) (right to challenge certain zoning ordinances); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614 (1973) (right to compel prosecution under certain circumstances); Note, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 359-64 (1924).
10. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1280 (1978).
11. 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978).
12. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See notes 40-61 infra and accompanying text.
13. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1280 (1978).
14. I.R.C. § 7805 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate rules
and regulations necessary for administration of the Code.
15. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, supra note 5, at 427. The concept of
standing has on occasion been recognized as "among the most amorphous in the
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tion, which permits federal courts to decide only "cases" and "controversies." 16 The notion of separation of powers embraced by article III prohibits federal courts from legislating, and thereby usurping
the function of another branch of government. The judiciary was
created to resolve disputes between adverse parties, not to answer
8 the Supreme Court held
abstract questions. 17 In Baker v. Carr,1
that, to have standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 1 9
In Flast v. Cohen,20 the Supreme Court reemphasized the adverseness requirement of article III focused on in Baker.2 1 The
entire domain of public law." Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498
(1966) (remarks of Prof. Freund).
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a discussion of the "case or controversy" limitation, see C. WRIGHT, THE LAV OF FEDERAL CouRTS 34-50 (2d ed. 1970).
17. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1935) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1910).
18. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). A group of voters alleged that they were denied their
right to equal protection, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, through the failure of the state legislature to reapportion seats in the general assembly in accordance
with shifts in the population over the 95 counties of Tennessee. Plaintiffs further
contended that a 1901 Tennessee statute had the effect of arbitrarily and capriciously
allocating the seats in the general assembly. Id. at 192-94.
19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-99 (1975) ("whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to
justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf" (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))).
20. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast, a group of taxpayers sued to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds to finance instruction and the purchase of instructional materials for use in religious schools, pursuant to Titles I and II of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241m, §§ 821-886 (Supp. II
1965-66) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241m, §§ 821-888 (1970)). They alleged that such financing by the federal government violated the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment. Under the authority of Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which 45 years earlier held that a taxpayer's interest in
challenging the constitutionality of federal expenditures was "comparatively minute
and indeterminable," id. at 487, a three-judge district court denied standing. Flast v.
Gardner, 271 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968). On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court holding, finding appellant taxpayers to have the requisite stake in the outcome "that [imparts)
the necessary concrete adverseness to such litigation so that standing can be conferred
on the taxpayer qua taxpayer consistent with the constitutional limitations of Article
III." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). For an elaborate discussion of Flast and
its ramifications, see Note, Taxpayer Standing to Litigate, 61 GEo. L.J. 747, 75065 (1973).
21. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Court, through Chief Justice Warren, set forth what is considered a
fundamental tenet of standing: "[Standing] focuses on the party
seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated." 2 2 Chief Justice Warren
further clarified this distinction by explaining that "when standing
is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable. ''2 3 Thus, the essence of standing involves consideration
of what constitutes a proper party for purposes of adjudicating a

particular claim.
In Association of Data Processing Services Organizations v.
Camp, 24 the Supreme Court enunciated a new criterion, the injury
in fact test, for determining whether plaintiffs have standing. 25
Plaintiffs in Data Processing sought to challenge a ruling by the
Comptroller of the Currency enabling national banks to make data
processing services available to other banks and bank customers.
Plaintiffs alleged a loss of future profits. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that a particular national bank was in the process of doing
business with a former customer of one of the plaintiffs. 20 The dis22.

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).

23. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Two companion cases
decided in 1974 incorporated into standing analysis the political question doctrine
which is designed to eliminate judicial usurpation of the functions of coordinate
branches of government. See generally Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In both,
denial of standing was based in part on the belief that the federal courts are not to be
used as a forum in which to address generalized grievances. See, e.g., Ex parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). It appears that the Court in both cases overlooked its
decision one year earlier in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (standing
conferred despite absence of economic injury), where it was expressed that "standing
is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury .... To deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody." Id. at 687-88. This suggests that the doctrine of
political questions is outside the scope of standing. Consequently, cases involving
political questions should be disposed of on that ground alone; the political question
doctrine ought seldom to be used to deny standing.
24.

397 U.S. 150 (1970).

25. Id. at 152.
26. Id. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Sierra Club, representing its members, sought to enjoin the construction of a skiing development in the
Mineral King Valley, within Sequoia National Park, California. While the Sierra Club
alleged injuries caused by the proposed construction, it failed to allege that its members used Mineral King and would thereby be adversely affected. One might speculate that plaintiffs in United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), took heed of the
stringent pleading requirements in Sierra Club, and couched their complaint accord-
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trict court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing.2 7 Under
the authority of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 28 the court
of appeals affirmed. 2 9 The case reached the Supreme Court, which
reversed. 30 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found plaintiffs'
allegations of lost profit sufficient to meet the injury in fact test. 3 1
The Court then set forth a second requirement: "whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 32 Examining section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 33 the Court concluded
that plaintiffs' interests arguably fell within the zone of interests
protected by section 4.34
ingly. "[O]ne who has no interest of his own at stake always lacks standing." K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTIATIVE LAW TExT, supra note 5, at 429.

27. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D.
Minn. 1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. 306 U.S. 118 (1939). Tennessee Power had applied the "legal interest" test,
which required the invasion of a legally protected interest, i.e., one in property, contract, tort, or conferred by statute. Id. at 137-38. This test was found by the Supreme
Court to go to the merits. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
29. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837 (8th Cir.
1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
30. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
31. Id. at 152. See Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). Contra,
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955) (economic injury in form of competition insufficient to confer standing).
32. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970) (emphasis added).
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1962), which provides: "No bank service corporation may
engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks."
34. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156
(1970). In a companion case decided the same day, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970), the Court applied the tests adopted in Data Processing and found standing. A
group of tenant farmers sought to invalidate an amended regulation issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture, which afforded plaintiffs' landlord the opportunity to force
plaintiffs to obtain all necessities from the landlord at exorbitant prices and rates of
interest. Reviewing a lower court holding of no "legal interest," Justice Douglas
concluded that plaintiffs met both the "injury in fact" test and the "zone of interest"
test. Id. at 164.
Professor Davis points out that the Court erroneously identified the tenant
farmers as being within the zone of protected interests. Davis, The Liberalized Law
of Standing, supra note 5, at 455 (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970)).
The proper test as he sees it, consistent with the phraseology of Data Processing, is
whether the particular interest asserted, rather than the party asserting the interest,
falls arguably within the zone of protected interests, an issue the Court never
reached in its decision. Id. Professor Davis speculates that probably no congressional
intent could be gleaned from the regulation, and had the Court focused on plaintiff
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Probably the most noted feature of Data Processing is the concurring opinion by Justices Brennan and White 3 5 which, presumably in light of Flast,3 6 rejected the zone of interests test.37 Justice
Brennan criticized the majority opinion in that, by "requiring a second, nonconstitutional step, the Court comes very close to perpetuating the discredited requirement that conditioned standing on a
showing by the plaintiff that the challenged governmental action invaded one of his legally protected interests." 38 Such a requirement
intertwines the question of standing with the merits, rendering
analysis of the issues more difficult. Justice Brennan accepted the
procedure of perusing relevant statutory materials, but stated that
such inquiry is made solely to determine the question of reviewability; otherwise, "the Court not only performs a useless and unnecessary exercise but also encourages badly reasoned decisions,
which may well deny justice in this complex field. "39
40
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
several organizations representing indigents and several indigents
acting on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated
brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, seeking to have Revenue Ruling 69-545
declared invalid and repealed. 4 1 The complaint alleged that the
farmers' particular interest, standing would have been denied. Id. at 456. See also
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S.
45 (1970) (both decisions found standing under Data Processing and Barlow).
35. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's concurrence was filed in both
Data Processing and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
36. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
37. See Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, supra note 5, at 457-68, for
several arguments suggesting the zone of interest test is disadvantageous and should
be abandoned. Some courts have demonstrated their support. See, e.g., Corey v. City
of Dallas, 492 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1974) (zone test ignored); Park View Heights
Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) ("injury in fact"
test only requirement). Cf. Scott, supra note 5, at 677-81 (discussion of other factors
courts tend to consider, beyond plaintiffs' stake in outcome). See also Albert, supra
note 5, at 494-97 (zone of interest test necessarily involves preliminary examination
of merits); Jaffe, supra note 5, at 634-35 (question of standing framed by BrennanWhite concurrence: one without "protected interest" does not have right to review,
but may be heard if court, in its discretion, determines that consideration of question
at hand is within public interest).
38. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 168 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of reviewability, see
id. at 169 n.2, 173-75.
40. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
41. 1969-2 C.B. 112.
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IRS violated the Code and the Administrative Procedure Act (the
APA) by issuing Revenue Ruling 69-545, which allegedly "encouraged" hospitals to deny service to plaintiffs. Under section 501 of
the Code, certain organizations may qualify for tax-exempt status if
operated for "charitable" purposes. 42 Since "charitable" is not defined in the Code, whether an organization fits the definition is
determined on a case-by-case basis. To aid nonprofit hospitals, the
IRS issued Revenue Ruling 56-185, 4 3 which set forth several requirements to be met if an organization is to be deemed "charitable" for
purposes of section 501(c)(3), and thus accorded favorable tax treatment. Revenue Ruling 56-185 requires an organization to provide
services to the needy to the extent of its financial ability, such as the
furnishing of services at rates below cost. The institution "must not
...
refuse to accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay
' 44
for such services.
Toward the end of 1968, the IRS promulgated Revenue Ruling
69-545, 4 5 which relaxed the requirements set forth in Revenue
Ruling 56-185. A particular hospital was the subject of the new
Ruling. 46 The change in tax treatment from nonexempt under
Revenue Ruling 56-185 to exempt under Revenue Ruling 69-545
was accounted for as follows: "Revenue Ruling 56-185 is hereby
modified to remove therefrom the requirements relating to caring
for patients without charge or at rates below cost." 4 7 The ruling
allowed hospitals to refuse patients unable to pay for services, and
to retain charitable status. Common sense suggests the inevitable
result: a rise in the number of such patients refused hospital services.
Plaintiffs in Eastern Kentucky included in their complaint occasions on which each of them, or members of their families, had
received adverse treatment from hospitals situated similarly to the
42. I.R.C. § 501. Subsection (a) states that organizations described in subsection
(c) "shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle ......
Subsection (c)(3) includes organizations that are "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or... for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
... An organization wishing to be granted
tax-exempt status, must not merely comply with the language of § 501(c)(3). It must
obtain a ruling letter from the IRS declaring its qualification. Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1
C.B. 698; Rev. Proc. 72-4, 1972-1 C.B. 706.
43. 1956-1 C.B. 202. The ruling defined the term "charitable" as used in I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) to embrace "an implied public trust constituted for some benefit ..
44. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
45. 1969-2 C.B. 117.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
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subject hospital. In particular, plaintiffs alleged refusal of admission, denial of treatment, and threat of suit. Plaintiffs asserted that
the IRS, by according such hospitals favorable tax treatment despite their refusal to serve the indigent, was encouraging the hospitals to deny services to plaintiffs, who were intended to be
among the statutory beneficiaries of section 501 of the Code. 48
Defendant IRS asserted that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Revenue Ruling 69-545. 4 9 The district court disagreed, and
invalidated Revenue Ruling 69-545 to the extent that it relaxed the
requirements formerly imposed by Revenue Ruling 56-185. 50 The
court of appeals affirmed on the standing issue, but reversed the
decision on the merits, finding Revenue Ruling 69-545 not contrary
to congressional intent surrounding the Code. 51 Both parties were
granted certiorari: plaintiffs on the merits, defendants on the stand52
ing issue.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Powell, held that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the ruling, and thus found it
unnecessary to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claim. 53 The Court, in
preparing to address the standing issue, posed an important question which it declined to address, and which consequently remains
unsettled: "whether a third party ever may challenge IRS treatment of another." 5 4 This question raises important policy considerations which require examination.
The IRS in Eastern Kentucky argued against permitting one to
contest the validity of a third party's tax status by reminding the
Court that historically our system of revenue collection has fostered
an attitude of judicial restraint. 55 The IRS further argued that the
48. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1976).
49. Defendants also asserted that the suit "in any event... was barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act, the tax limitation in the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity," all of which defenses were rejected. Id. at 34-35 (footnote omitted). See note 4 supra.
50. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 338 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
51. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1287-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
52. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 35 (1976).
53. Id. at 36.

54. Id. at 37. But see id. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring): "I cannot now imagine a
case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax

liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability

of someone else."
55. The IRS cited Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914) (complaint dis-
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history of revenue collection
manifests a consistent congressional intent to vest exclusive authority for the administration of the tax laws in the Secretary and

his duly authorized delegates, subject to oversight by the appropriate committees of Congress itself.

. .

. [A]llowing third-party

suits questioning the tax treatment accorded other taxpayers
would transfer determination of general revenue policy away
from those to whom Congress has entrusted it and vest it in the
58
federal courts.
The Court failed to explore the competing policies inextricably tied to judicial restraint: protecting the integrity of the IRS as a
revenue collecting agency and protecting the public from arbitrary
decisionmaking. Rather, Eastern Kentucky was decided on the
basis of standing alone. The Court addressed the article III case
and controversy requirement, acknowledging that standing " 'focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issue he wishes to have adjudicated.' "57 The
Court then examined the tests announced in Data Processing, but
never reached the zone of interests test.58 Focusing on injury in
fact, the Court determined that it was "purely speculative"
whether the denial of services alleged by plaintiffs stemmed from
the newly promulgated revenue ruling, rather than from ordinary
missed when State of Louisiana challenged tariff rates for sugar imported from Cuba).
As the Court in Eastern Kentucky dismissed the suit on grounds of standing, the
Court declined to express an opinion as to the applicability of McAdoo. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36 n.14 (1976).
56. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36 (1976) (footnote
omitted). See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), where the Court construed the Code's Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), as consistent with the policy
espoused in McAdoo. The Act provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court .... ." Id. A
private university, seeking to enjoin revocation of a ruling letter granting it taxexempt status, was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act as construed earlier in Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). In a companion case to Bob
Jones, Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974), the AntiInjunction Act was similarly applied.
57. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
58. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976). It
appears, however, that if the Court had found injury in fact, there would have been
no problem in finding also that plaintiffs were within the zone of protected interests,
as defined in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). "Evidence that the plaintiff's class is a statutory beneficiary ... need not be
as strong for the purpose of obtaining review as for the purpose of establishing the
plaintiff's claim on the merits." Id. at 175-76 (Brennan, J. concurring).
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hospital decisions independent of tax considerations. 59 Thus, it

would be "equally speculative" whether invalidation of Revenue
Ruling 69-545, and a return to prior policy embodied in Revenue
Ruling 56-185, would adequately redress plaintiffs' grievances by
increasing availability of hospital services. 60 There was nothing to
indicate that a hospital would not forego favorable tax treatment to
avoid excessive financial drain from uncompensated services. It appears that plaintiffs needed to show that the financial dependence
of nonprofit hospitals on their charitable status was so great that
any tightening of the requirements for favorable tax treatment
would necessarily effect a concomitant modification of hospital policy to maintain compliance with the standards. This amounts to
asking plaintiffs to rule out all other possible results before a court
would grant the requested relief.6 ' The problem lies in placing the
burden on the party least able to bear it. As Justice Brennan stated
in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Eastern Kentucky:

59. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976).
60. Id. at 43.
61. See note 100 infra and accompanying text. The Court in Eastern Kentucky
cited two cases as controlling its decision: Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973), and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Linda R.S., the mother of an
illegitimate child sought to enjoin the "discriminatory application" of a Texas statute
providing for the prosecution of any parent failing to support his or her children. The
Texas courts had consistently construed the provision to apply only to married parents, which plaintiff alleged violated the fourteenth amendment. The injunction, if
granted, would have forced the district attorney to prosecute the father. The Court
denied standing, holding that granting "the requested relief... would result only in
the jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will . . . result in
payment of support [was] only speculative." Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
618 (1973). In Warth, several organizations and individuals from Rochester, New
York sought to invalidate a zoning ordinance excluding persons of low and moderate
income from residing in the neighboring town of Penfield. Justice Powell, speaking
for the Court, suggested that petitioners' inability to reside in Penfield "is the consequence of the economics of the area housing market, rather than of respondents'
assertedly illegal acts." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 506 (1975).
But see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), where standing was conferred on plaintiffs who alleged that ICC approval of a rate increase would discourage the use of recyclable materials, causing more refuse to be discarded in national
parks. Since a determination whether to use recyclable materials by the industries
affected by an ICC increase would most likely be based on a wide range of factors,
one would be hard pressed to draw any tighter causal connection between the ICC
action and resultant injury in SCRAP than between the IRS action and resultant injury in Eastern Kentucky. Additionally, the Court in SCRAP accepted the smallest
degree of injury as sufficient to support a claim of standing. Id. at 689 n.14. It appears that, insofar as the "injury in fact" requirement is concerned, SCRAP and Eastern Kentucky are indistinguishable. See Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Easten Kentucky: "[Tihe Court's attempted distinction of SCRAP will not 'wash.'"
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[Any time Congress chooses to legislate in favor of certain interests by setting up a scheme of incentives for third parties, judicial review of administrative action that allegedly frustrates the
congressionally intended objective will be denied, because any
complainant will be required to make an almost impossible show62
ing.
PROSPECTS FOR THIRD PARTIES UNDER

Data Processing AND Eastern Kentucky
Two 1977 decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit shed light on the current trend regarding
litigation of a third party's tax liability. In American Society of
Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumentha163 the court focused on the Data
Processing injury in fact requirement. In Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal,64 decided three months earlier, the court
applied the "zone of interests" test. Both decisions examine the
issue of competitor standing, which centers on the ability of one
competitor to challenge administrative agency treatment accorded
65
another competitor.
In ASTA, plaintiffs sought to challenge the tax treatment of the
American Jewish Congress (AJC) and other similarly situated organizations receiving tax benefits under section 501(c)(3) of the
Code. 66 ASTA alleged that AJC and other tax-exempt organizations
had been conducting extensive travel programs unrelated to the
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes which are
required by section 501(c)(3). ASTA contended that the income derived by AJC and other exempt organizations should be taxed as
"unrelated business income,"-67 or, alternatively, that AJC and
other exempt organizations forfeit their section 501(c)(3) exemp-

Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 62 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
62. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 64 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
63. 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978).
64. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1280 (1978).
65. See generally Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). The particular administrative agency challenged in Data Processing was
the Comptroller of the Currency; in ASTA and Tax Analysts, the IRS.
66. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
67. I.R.C. § 511(a) imposes a tax on the "unrelated business income" of organizations subject to id. § 501(c)(3). Id. § 513(a) defines "unrelated business" as "any
trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ...to the exercise
or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose
or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501 ....
"
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tions, since they were no longer operated exclusively for any of the
68
purposes set forth in that section.
Private travel agents package transportation and travel-related
services and sell them at a price high enough to cover a commission. ASTA alleged that AJC and a number of other tax-exempt
organizations increasingly expanded their practice of marketing
similar tour packages. Because of the tax advantage accorded them,
the tax-exempt organizations incurred lower costs and thus were
able to sell tour packages at lower prices. As a result, they gained a
competitive edge.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.6 9 On appeal by ASTA,
the court of appeals, under the authority of Eastern Kentucky, denied standing for want of actual injury. 70 Again the court required
the plaintiffs to rule out all alternative possibilities when identifying
the source of their injury. This requirement incorporates concepts
of causation and capacity for redress into injury in fact analysis.71
The court suggested that the lower cost of the tour packages
might be traced to the use of volunteer labor or a greater willingness on the part of nonprofit organizations to accept lower profits,
that granting the requested relief would not shift business because
of personal preferences among customers, 72 and that travel tours
sold by section 501(c)(3) organizations would decline without ac-

68.

American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 148

(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
69. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d
75-5142 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nor. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v.

Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
70.

566 F.2d 145, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).

71. Id. at 148. "Causation and redressability, far from being prudential matters
to be evaluated seriatim only after constitutional standing has been established, are
part and parcel of the 'injury in fact' requirement arising from the 'case or con-

troversy' language in Article III." Id. at 149 n.2. See notes 100-101 infra and accompanying text. "Redressability" can be explained as follows: An injury is redressable if, upon a court's granting the requested relief, the injury to plaintiff is
alleviated. Conversely, if a court grants the requested relief and it fails to solve the

plaintiff's problem, it must be concluded that plaintiff's injury was caused by something else, and therefore is not redressable. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
72. One possible disincentive for an American Jewish Congress (AJC) customer
to change to a private tour can be traced to I.R.C. § 170, which permits the deduction of certain contributions, including those to organizations described in id. § 501.
Though payments for services rendered are not properly deductible under id. § 170,

there may be a temptation to deduct on the federal income tax return the full amount
of a check bearing the name of such a qualifying organization.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/6

12

Gerber: Standing to Challenge Internal Revenue Service Decisionmaking: Th

19781

STANDING TO CHALLENGE IRS DECISIONMAKING

companying increases elsewhere in the industry. 73 These assertions
should not provide a basis for the result reached. Even assuming
that nonprofit organizations will accept lower profits than private
travel agents, if the benefiting organizations would not charge such
a low price absent their tax advantage, then at least a portion of the
price 74 must be attributed to section 501(c)(3). Every merchant
considers costs when computing price. Moreover, given two organizations virtually identical except that one has tax exempt status,
either the prices charged by each organization will differ, or the
prices will be the same but the quality of services will be disparate.
In either event, the non-tax-exempt members of ASTA suffer injury
in fact. If the prices charged by the non-tax-exempt merchants are
higher, they will not be competitive. If the prices charged are
lower, the quality of services must necessarily decline, resulting
over time in a loss of business to the non-tax-exempt merchants.
Ironically, contrary to the court's suggestion that ASTA members
are not injured because AJC is willing to accept lower profits, for
ASTA members to maintain a competitive position, they must be
willing to accept lower profits.
In addition, customer preferences would be readily outweighed by the economic distortion of the marketplace that would
occur if substantial external costs were suddenly imposed on a
member of the industry. Indeed, it is unrealistic to suggest that
there will be no effect on business if the tax-exempt status of an
organization is revoked. 75 Finally, to conjecture that membership
in section 501(c)(3) organizations would decline without a corresponding increase in competitors' business ignores reality: An
increase in the taxes of a tax-exempt organization will not cause
people to develop an aversion to travel. Therefore, plaintiffs in
ASTA did suffer "some threatened or actual injury resulting from
the putatively illegal action." 7 6 Thus, causation can be an effective
device, when integrated into traditional notions of standing, to
avoid hearing an issue which a court chooses not to decide on the
7
merits. 7
73. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 150
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
74. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 & n.14 (1973) (magnitude of
stake in outcome disregarded).

75. See id.
76. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
77. See notes 54-61 supra and accompanying text.
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Because ASTA dealt with the issue of competitor standing,
though in the context of a third party's tax treatment, it is worthwhile to compare the facts of ASTA with those of Data Processing. 78 In Data Processing, the Comptroller of the Currency permitted certain national banks to supply data processing services to
other banks and bank customers, thereby causing invasion of the
data processing market. Similarly, in ASTA, the IRS gave AJC the
ability to charge lower prices and invade the market of plaintiffs
represented by ASTA. Indeed, the cases are analogous. The court
79
in ASTA nevertheless attempted to distinguish Data Processing
by stating: "Whatever may be the impact of competitor standing
when ordinary administrative action is at issue, . . . Data Processing should [not] be read to endorse standing for any private business . . . which wishes to contest the tax treatment of a competitor."80 This assertion strikes at the heart of the matter; its validity
is unquestionable insofar as Data Processing may be limited to its
facts. In accordance with the congressional intent addressed in
Louisiana v. McAdoo,"' courts are loath to permit interference
with our system of revenue collection.8 2 This policy should be directly confronted and weighed against competing policies. If the
balance is in favor of judicial restraint, then it would be justifiable for a court to dispose of a case on this ground.8 3 Most impor78. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
See notes 24-39 supra and accompanying text.
79. The court premised its distinction by stating that "the rather cryptic phrasing of Data Processing does not clearly define the contours of competitor standing as

conceived by the Supreme Court." American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
80. Id. (emphasis added); see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. 234 U.S. 627 (1914). See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974); Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,
370 U.S. 1 (1962); Wolkstein v. New York Port Auth., 178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959).
But see McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Pitts v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Green v. Kennedy, 309 F.
Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), later decision reported sub nom. Green v. Connally, 330
F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), summarily aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971).
83. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), as amended by Act
of Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1719, seems to support this view. It
provides in part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
Federal taxes other than action brought under section 7428 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, ai.y court of the United States . . .may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
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tantly, this argument must be removed from the spectrum of standing arguments, and be allowed by its own force to deny access to
the courts to litigate the tax liability of a third party.8 4 As suction, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Id. (emphasis added). Accord, "Americans United" Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169,
1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. "Americans
United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974) (Supreme Court avoided passing upon question).
But see McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 (D.D.C. 1972), in which
the court held the Declaratory Judgment Act coterminous with the Anti-Injunction
Act (referred to there as Tax Injunction Act), I.R.C. § 7421(a), limiting its construction to cases purporting to "restrain the assessment or collection of any tax." See also
Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'g 74-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9121 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (Anti-Injunction Act barred suit).
84. Judge McGowan, writing for the majority in ASTA, resignedly approached
the first paragraph of the opinion. He recognized that ASTA presented
a threshold issue of standing to sue reminiscent of Justice Stewart's observation, concurring in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
... that he could not "imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment
area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected ever could
have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else."
American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 147 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (citation omitted) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 46 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978). This demonstrates the court's reluctance to apply the standing doctrine when it realizes it is in
reality a policy question it decides.
The final distinction that the court attempted to draw between Data Processing
and ASTA rested on the relief requested in Data Processing: the elimination of illegal competition from national banks. In contrast, in ASTA, the AJC and other
exempt organizations would remain free to carry on business if the remedy sought
were granted. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145,
151 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978). Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting, attempted to dispel the majority's fears by pointing out that this distinction
"goes only to the extent of the injury suffered, not to its speculative or hypothetical
nature." Id. at 160 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Bazelon also
noted in the course of his dissent that the majority reasoning was "flatly contradictory" to Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), the complaint of which
alleged, with no more specificity than was used in ASTA, competitive injury. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978). See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) ("further
economic and competitive injury" held sufficient for injunction).
See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which set forth certain tests to determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute, several of which might prove
relevant to third-party tax cases:
[1] [D]oes the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?...
[2] [I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one? ...
[3] [I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
Id. at 78 (citations omitted). See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (Court will not pass upon a constitutional question when
nonconstitutional doctrines would suffice).
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cinctly stated by the district court in ASTA, "[A court's jurisdiction]
may not be invoked to undertake continuing supervision of IRS's
85
administration of the Internal Revenue Code."
ASTA was pending at the time Eastern Kentucky was decided,
and was thereafter decided in light of Eastern Kentucky. 8 6 Chief
Judge Bazelon, in his dissent, found that Eastern Kentucky was not
controlling.87 It is worthwhile to examine whether the majority's
conclusion in ASTA was mandated by Eastern Kentucky. In Eastern
Kentucky, as in ASTA, the Court found plaintiffs' claim too speculative to warrant invocation of the court's jurisdiction. 88 The Court
there suggested that decisions by hospitals to refuse services to indigents were based upon independent financial considerations, thus
rendering moot any remedy the Court might impose. On this
point, Chief Judge Bazelon, in his dissent to ASTA, 8 9 agreed.
Bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in Eastern Kentucky,
Chief Judge Bazelon was forced to distinguish ASTA from Eastern
Kentucky to justify his dissent. Chief Judge Bazelon's view of plaintiffs' position was as follows:
The premise of the plaintiffs' argument was that hospitals were
so dependent upon deductible donations that they would perform whatever services were necessary to qualify for § 501(c)(3)
status. That premise, as a logical or economic prediction, was
clearly false: there was no way of knowing in advance whether
the increased income from charitable contributions would exceed
the increased costs of providing additional services. The result
...would "vary from hospital to hospital. ' 9°
85. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Simon, 36 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 2d
75-5142,75-5144 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. American Soc'y ofTravel Agents, Inc. v.
Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978). See
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom.
Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978), where the court similarly felt the need to espouse policy considerations in aid of its decision. The court addressed "the Executive Branch's concern for the potential wave of law suits which could deluge the IRS and leave it
floundering for time and people to continue its normal responsibilities of revenue
collection." Id. at 942.
86. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 147
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978).
87. Id. at 158-59 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
88. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976). See text
accompanying notes 59 & 60 supra.
89. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v, Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 159
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 1533 (1978).
90. Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 43 (1976)).
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The dissent proceeded to distinguish ASTA, stating that the
injury alleged by the private travel agents "does not depend upon
the discreet decisions of particular institutions or specific customers"9' as he suggested it did in Eastern Kentucky. Rather, as Chief
Justice Bazelon explained, the injury in ASTA derives from a "sys92
tematic distortion of the marketplace."
This distinction ought not to control the results of both cases.
Eastern Kentucky in substance deals with the same type of economic injury as alleged in ASTA: a tax benefit to a third party
which injures the plaintiff. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence and
dissent to Eastern Kentucky, found "the Court's treatment of the
injury-in-fact standing requirement . . . simply unsupportable
.... "93 He viewed the indigents' claim to be not that they had
been and would continue to be denied services, but that the government, in violation of the Code, had created conditions adverse
to the indigents. The relevant inquiry, according to Justice Brennan, is whether there was injury to respondents' beneficial interest:
"their 'opportunity and ability' to receive medical services." 94 This
injury was sufficiently alleged in the same way that competitive injury was alleged in ASTA. To be granted standing, the indigents
should not be required to allege the hospitals' dependence upon
charitable benefactors and the hospitals' resultant inability to forego
favorable tax treatment. 95 Moreover, allegation of past injury is un96
necessary so long as injury is imminent.
Thus, the facts of Eastern Kentucky and ASTA appear indistin91. American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 159
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).

92. Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
93. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 55 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting).
94. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting). Justice
Brennan then concluded that such injury would provide the personal stake "sufficient to create concrete adverseness .
" Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment
and dissenting) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
95. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 56 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment and dissenting). See notes 100-101 infra and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1968). Justice Brennan proceeded to point out the conflict between Eastern Kentucky and past decisions of the Court. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 58 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment and
dissenting) (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils.
Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968)).
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guishable. Because courts are bound to apply the law as the Supreme Court construes it, 9 7 the result in ASTA was a foregone conclusion. 98 It appears, however, that cases are being decided on the
wrong issue. Courts have become involved in construing the
threshold concept of standing to accommodate concepts of causation which ought not to inhere in the standing doctrine. 99
The court in ASTA, as did the Court in Eastern Kentucky,
effectively required that pleadings which contain assertions of
standing be framed in a fashion more cumbersome than warranted
by article III. This circumvents the notions of modem pleading
embodied in rule 8(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 100
By imposing insurmountable pleading requirements, a court can
effectively decide, without confronting the merits, which cases it
will not hear. It is impossible to rule out all alternative possibilities
when showing a causal link between allegedly illegal actions and
plaintiffs' injury. 101 Unless a new approach is taken, courts are
likely to continue applying the standing doctrine in this manner to
10 2
avoid hearing third-party tax cases.
In Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Blumenthal,10 3 a nonprofit
corporation organized for the purpose of promoting tax reform, and
its director, Field, brought an action challenging the validity of certain IRS rulings issued pursuant to section 901(b) of the Code, 10 4
which allows a tax credit for income taxes paid by United States oil
companies to foreign nations in connection with oil extraction. The
relief requested included a declaratory judgment that such rulings
were contrary to the Code, and an injunction requiring the IRS to
withdraw the rulings and collect past taxes.' 0 5 Plaintiffs' claim was
97. James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 359
U.S. 1006 (1959).

98. See American Soc'y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 145, 147
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1533 (1978).
99. See Tushnet, supra note 5, at 680-88.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1) provides: "Each averment of a pleading shall be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleadings or motions are required."
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). See also C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING §
38 (2d ed. 1947); 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

8.12-.13 (1975); C. WRIGHT &

A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1202 (1969).

101. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
102. But see Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Shultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974) (standing upheld on challenge to revenue ruling permitting donor to claim
multiple gift tax exemptions).
103. 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978).
104. Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386; Rev. Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306.
105. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 134 (D.C. Cir.
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based on the notion that the payments made to foreign countries
were not taxes on income, but rather royalties paid for the right to
extract oil, which are properly deducted against income instead of
offset against tax liability. Plaintiff Field, asserting competitor
standing'0 6 as the owner of an oil well, was under an obligation to
pay royalties regularly to the owner of the land on which his oil
well was located. In particular, Field alleged that because the international oil companies control the market, that is, they set price
for the industry, and because they receive the benefit of such a tax
credit, the price of oil was depressed below what it would normally
have been if the payments had been treated as royalties rather than
taxes. 10 7 Furthermore, the disparity in rate of return caused by the
discriminatory treatment resulted in a less attractive investment,
with a consequently lower market value.' 0 8
The case came before the district court on defendant's motion
to dismiss. The district court granted defendant's motion, dismissing the claim of competitor standing on both injury in fact and zone
of interests grounds. 10 9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). Plaintiffs' claim as federal taxpayers, "a
personal pecuniary interest in requiring that the IRS assess and collect taxes owed
by other taxpayers to the fullest possible extent under the provisions of the Code,"
was summarily dismissed. Id. at 134 & n.10 (quoting Amended Complaint $ 3-4,
Joint Appendix at 39). The court of appeals affirmed the reasoning of the district
court, which found no injury to plaintiffs since it was not alleged that the specific
Code provisions were unconstitutional. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F.
Supp. 927, 932-37 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978).
106. See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
107. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978).
108. Id. at 136-37.
109. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927, 938-42 (D.D.C.
1975), aff'd sub nom. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). On the issue of competitor standing,
which the court termed APA (Administrative Procedure Act) standing, the court
applied the tests set forth in Data Processing,construing § 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §
702 (1976), which provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." The Supreme Court has held that
§ 10 must be construed liberally. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140-41 (1967); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955). However, review is
not authorized where "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976). Because plaintiff
Field grounded his complaint in the APA as an "aggrieved party," the court required
him to show injury in fact and demonstrate that he is "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Simon, 390 F. Supp. 927, 938 (D.D.C. 1975),
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District of Columbia Circuit disagreed on the injury in fact issue,
treating it summarily, 1 10 and proceeded to apply the zone of interests test. The court first constructed an entire foundation reflecting
its views of the purpose and significance of the zone of interests
test, including identification of "Congressional action as embodied
in statute" as the gravamen of the zone of interests limitation."'
One question the court decided is whether, when searching
for the zone of interests which Congress intended to protect, it is
proper to consider only that section of the statute which is under
consideration, or to consider other sections of the statute as well.
The court resolved to look solely at the provision in question. The
size and complexity of the Code preclude considering other sections. In addition, other statutory provisions implicate goals and
policies that are unrelated to plaintiff's injury. Thus, including
other sections of the Code in the zone of interests test may reduce
plaintiff's "connection to the controversy, '" 112 making the possibilities of litigation endless.113 The utility, then, of having a zone at all
would be limited. On the other hand, in those cases where one person is injured through application of a statute to another person,
more likely than not, the statute will bear no relation to the injured
party. In such cases, it will be virtually impossible to meet the zone
of interests test.
The purpose of section 901 is to prevent double taxation of
United States companies operating abroad and paying foreign income taxes. 114 Field could only successfully assert that section 901
affd sub nora. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). The court held that he failed both tests, but
it is interesting to note that the district court need never have reached the "zone"

test, having determined that there was no injury in fact. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976).
110. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 138 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). The court, speaking through Judge Wilkey,
disposed of the problem in one paragraph without full explanation. Id.
111. Id. at 140. See Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 175 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring): "The merits are also touched in establishing reviewability in cases
where the plaintiff's right to review must be inferred from evidence that his class is
a statutory beneficiary."
112. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 141 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). The court implied in dicta that if there
were a unifying purpose throughout the Code, it would look beyond the purview of
the statute in question.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 143. Plaintiff Field might have argued that despite the policies embodied in § 901, the overriding principle of "horizontal" equity requires that "people
in equal position should pay equal amounts of tax." See Musgrave, In Defense of an
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governs his interests if a court were willing to accept the premise
that section 901 can be read in part "as a decision not to grant a tax
credit to those who have made other sorts of payments, such as royalties, to foreign governments."1 1 5 This the court was unwilling to
do, and justifiably so. Otherwise, the zone of interests test could
always be satisfied by merely using this reverse analysis. Plaintiff
Field was thus denied standing based on his failure to assert an interest that arguably falls within the zone of interests of the statute in question."16
Chief Judge Bazelon, however, in his dissent to Tax Analysts,
proposed a more equitable application of the zone of interests test,
that is, to include within the zone "those interests upon which the
statute has a readily foreseeable impact.""z 7 This would eliminate
the use of narrowly construed statutes to deprive plaintiffs of an
opportunity to be heard. Moreover, it would help to eliminate judicial manipulation of a powerful tool for avoidance, thereby encouraging greater confrontation of critical issues.
A PRoPosAL
One commentator has stated that "standing serves, on occasion, as a shorthand expression for all the various elements of jusIncome Concept, 81 HARV. L. REv. 44, 45 (1967). Thus, it would follow that granting
the credit to oil companies abroad undermines this notion that pervades our entire
system of income taxation.
115. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 144 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
The court labeled this attenuated reasoning "reverse zone of interest" analysis. Rejection of such analysis is necessary to avoid an infinite number of possible arguments based on the negative implications of a particular statutory provision. Id. But
see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1970) Brennan, J., concurring): "Evidence that the plaintiff's class is a statutory beneficiary, however, need not be as
strong for the purpose of obtaining review as for the purpose of establishing the
plaintiff's claim on the merits."
116. Few, if any, cases have ever been dismissed on zone of interest grounds
because the test is ambiguous. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 113, 122 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring); Albert, supra note 5, at 475 n.230.
117. Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 162 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280
(1978). In support of this proposition, Chief Judge Bazelon cited Cotovsky-Kaplan
Physical Therapy Ass'n v. United States, 507 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (7th Cir. 1975) (per
Stevens, J.). Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 162 n.51 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978). He also
cited and discussed Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), and Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), as enunciating and applying this test. Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1280 (1978).
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ticiability ......
118 Another commentator has referred to standing
decisions as "concealed decisions on the merits."1 19 The results become more acute in cases such as those outlined in this note, presumably due to a natural reluctance to interfere with our system of
revenue collection. What is needed is a more viable framework for
the hurdles of third-party tax cases.
In McGlotten v. Connally,12 0 a black American sued to enjoin
the Secretary of the Treasury from granting tax benefits to fraternal
and nonprofit organizations which excluded nonwhites from membership. The court held that plaintiff had standing to challenge the
constitutionality of certain Code provisions and "to challenge a system of federal support and encouragement of segregated fraternal
organizations.' 2 ' McGlotten was instrumental in "breaking the ice"
for suits challenging a third-party's tax status. 122 Unfortunately, for
most plaintiffs, there are few valid constitutional objections to
Treasury action.' 23 The reason for the distinction in standing between constitutional and nonconstitutional allegations is worthy of
attention. Evidently, there is a strong policy in favor of adjudicating and redressing constitutional, as opposed to nonconstitutional,
violations. But this question goes to the merits of the case, and not
to standing. No decisions have inquired, for purposes of standing,
whether the plaintiff has alleged violation of a constitutional provision. Neither has the question been put alongside the injury in fact
and zone of interests tests, to be applied in sequence. Nevertheless, McGlotten provides an inroad to ostensibly unapproachable
12 4
IRS rulemaking.
118. Lewis, ConstitutionalRights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L.
REv. 433, 453 (1962).
119. Tushnet, supra note 5, at 663.
120. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972). Chief Judge Bazelon presided over a
three-judge district court.
121. Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
122. See also Pitts v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis.
1971) (standing upheld for non-Caucasian plaintiffs contesting validity of state statute
granting tax exemption to organizations discriminating in their membership on basis
of race). But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (black guest,
denied service at private club, lacked standing to challenge club's membership practices; stricter construction of "injury").
123. See Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing"the
Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 55 (1972). Professor Bittker and Mr. Kaufman wrote that what are effectively "tax subsidies" for discriminatory organizations
may provide the basis of constitutional claims. Id. at 55, 63-68.
124. It seems possible for an attorney to draft a complaint with constitutional
overtones to bypass the threshold determination of standing. However, rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an attorney, before signing pleadings,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss4/6

22

Gerber: Standing to Challenge Internal Revenue Service Decisionmaking: Th

1978]

STANDING TO CHALLENGE IRS DECISIONMAKING

One might argue that the revenue rulings at issue in Eastern
Kentucky, by granting the hospitals tax benefits, were discriminatory. Unfortunately, in light of Washington v. Davis, 12 5 which requires a discriminatory intent to trigger the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the effectiveness of this approach is
12 6
doubtful.
Denial of standing, as it relates to challenges to IRS rulemaking, has resulted in the accumulation of cumbersome pleading requirements, which serve only to distort the doctrine of standing. 127
Whether a party may interfere with IRS decisionmaking should be
a matter for courts to decide on the merits, perhaps adopting a
128
series of tests to decide whether a right of action ought to exist.
Justice Stewart's concurrence in Eastern Kentucky presents an
extreme viewpoint concerning a question which the majority refrained from addressing.' 29 Justice Stewart could not imagine any
case outside the first amendment area where one could litigate
another's tax liability.' 30 This is consistent with the hands-off policy
accorded our revenue collection system and our "concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society."131
Probably the best way to resolve the problem of judicial arbitrariness in this area is to create a statute that expressly allows or
must believe "that there is good ground to support them." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Presumably, this limits the number of frivolous lawsuits.
125. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
126. See id. at 238-48. The same obstacles are manifest in Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975), where low-income individuals were excluded by a zoning ordinance
from residing in a particular community. Where, however, there is a congressional
policy favoring a plaintiff, standing will be upheld. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring). See also O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
n.3 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 & n.3 (1972); Hardin v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968). This principle should apply equally to thirdparty tax cases.
127. See notes 100-101 supra and accompanying text.
128. For the tests set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), see note 84
supra.
129. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
130. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). McGlotten was argued under the fifthi
amendment, but there should be no problem in finding a deprivation of first
amendment liberty to accord with Justice Stewart's concurrence in Eastern Kentucky.
131. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citations omitted). See Louisiana
v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914): "Interference [by the courts] in such a case would
be to interfere with the ordinary function of government." Id. at 633.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1978

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 4 [1978], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 6: 1041

disallows disputing a third party's federal tax treatment. 132 This
would demonstrate the extent of congressional willingness either to
comport with or to circumvent the traditional notions of judicial
restraint afforded our system of revenue collection. Frivolous
claims would be dismissed on the merits by evaluation of plaintiff's
complaint in light of a comprehensive examination of appropriate
legislative history. As more cases are decided, a reliable set of
precedents will develop. The initial problem is taking the first step
in that direction.
One procedural point is worth mentioning. As stated earlier,
fundamental to a suit that a federal court will entertain is that it
meet the "case and controversy" requirement of article III. Baker
v. Cart' 33 refined this requirement to "concrete adverseness" between the parties. 134 Ironically, inasmuch as plaintiff will be litigating to the fullest of his ability, the adverseness of the Government
appears questionable, since it might have a financial interest in losing. This was so in Eastern Kentucky, ASTA, and Tax Analysts.
However, this is no reason to bar the suit so long as potentially
affected parties receive notice of the suit and have ample opportunity to intervene on behalf of the Government. Of course, where a
suit can potentially affect a great number of parties, many problems
will arise in providing adequate notice. At least one commentator
believes that such a decision, which canfiot be binding on those not
parties to the suit under principles of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, should be accorded little or no precedential value should
an affected party choose to relitigate the issue. 135
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of standing, as applied, renders legal challenges to
IRS decisions underscrutinized. The application of traditional principles of standing to address a party's right to challenge Treasury
132. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 131-32 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("Any hazards to the proper allocation of authority among the three branches of the
Government would be substantially diminished if public actions had been pertinently authorized by Congress and the President").
133. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134. Id. at 204.
135. Bittker & Kaufnan, supra note 123, at 59-61. See also Special Committee,
ABA Section of Taxation, Report on Standing to Sue, 25 TAX LAw. 631 (1972), which
shows concern for possible plaintiffs "whose real purpose is not to test the Regulations but rather to have them validated before a real adversary gets involved." Id.
at 632.
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rulemaking serves only to distort further the nebulous and unresolved doctrine of standing. As more cases of this type arise, the situation may be aggravated. The courts would be well advised to remove all such cases from the realm of current standing philosophy.
This would accomplish two objectives: (1) It would aid in restoring
the integrity of the standing doctrine, and (2) it would permit courts
to be more candid in their decisions, which have always contained
a flavor of the merits despite language to the contrary. The consequences of such an undertaking should provide a body of case law
consistent in application and just in result.
Clifford M. Gerber
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